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Introduction: Mentalization concerns the human ability to understand the actions
of others (and oneself) in terms of intentional mental states. Theoretically, the notion
has been described via the poles of automatic, non-verbal implicit mentalization as
opposed to conscious and verbal explicit mentalization. In this article, we challenge this
standard distinction by examining examples from psychotherapy. We argue that explicit
mentalization can also be carried out via embodied non-verbal actions.
Method: Four cases of real-life interaction from psychotherapy sessions are analyzed
from the qualitative perspective of embodied cognition and multimodal interaction
analysis. The analyses are based on video data transformed into transcriptions and
anonymized drawings from a larger cognitive ethnography study conducted at a
psychiatric hospital in Denmark.
Results: The analyses demonstrate the gradual development from predominantly
implicit mentalizing to predominantly explicit mentalizing. In the latter part of the
examples, the mentalizing activity is initiated by the therapist on an embodied level but in
an enlarged and complex manner indicating a higher level of awareness, imagination, and
reflection. Thus, the standard assumption of explicit mentalization as contingent on verbal
language is challenged, since it is demonstrated how processes of explicit mentalization
can take place on an embodied level without the use of words.
Conclusion: Based on real-life data, the study demonstrates that online processes of
implicit and explicit mentalization are gradual and interwoven with embodied dynamics
in real-life interaction. Thus, the analyses establish a window into how mentalization is
carried out by psychotherapists through interaction, which testifies to the importance
of embodied non-verbal behavior in psychotherapy. Further, informed by the notion of
affordance-space, the study points to alternative ways of conceptualizing the intertwined
nature of bodies and environment in relation to conveying more complex understandings
of other people.
Keywords: mentalization, social interaction, psychotherapy, embodied cognition, re-enactment, affordance
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INTRODUCTION
The notion of mentalization designates the capacity to
understand each other as mindful beings driven by emotions,
wishes, needs, desires, and so forth and to be aware of these
motivating factors when we engage in social interaction (Fonagy
et al., 2002; Bateman and Fonagy, 2006). The concept of
mentalization was originally coined and developed by Fonagy
and colleagues in relation to their work with patients with
borderline personality disorders (Allen et al., 2003; Bateman
and Fonagy, 2012). Today, mentalization is widely used as a
clinical framework for treating a number of disorders, such as
post-traumatic stress disorder, eating disorders, and depression
(Bateman and Fonagy, 2010). Furthermore, mentalization is
now also more broadly used as a general concept aimed at an
important intersubjective aspect of human understanding, which
is used in many different contexts such as social work in schools
(Twemlow and Fonagy, 2006), in health communication, and in
organizational practice (Fonagy, 2006). A defining characteristic
of the concept of mentalization is the way it is structured
around four different dimensions, each defined in virtue of two
polarities with a gradual transition between them: self–other,
affective–cognitive, internal–external, and explicit–implicit.
In this article, the authors present a qualitative study with
a specific focus on empirically investigating the relationship
between implicit and explicit mentalization from real-life data
from psychotherapy. Accordingly, the study provides in-depth
analyses of actual practices of mentalizing in social interaction,
as opposed to post-hoc interviews with patients or therapists or
experimental data from a clinical setting. This qualitative vantage
point allows for more detailed investigations of some of the basic
assumptions within the literature on mentalization, in particular,
the distinction between explicit and implicit mentalizing. In a
recent publication, Fonagy and Bateman (2019) describe this
dimension of mentalizing in the following way:
The most fundamental dimension to mentalizing is the spectrum
between automatic (or implicit) and controlled (or explicit)
mentalizing. Controlled mentalizing reflects a serial and relatively
slow process, which is typically verbal and demands reflection,
attention, awareness, intention, and effort. The opposite pole
of this dimension, automatic mentalizing, involves much faster
processing, tends to be reflexive, and requires little or no
attention, intention, awareness, or effort. (p. 8).
In the literature on mentalization, implicit mentalizing, on the
one hand, is described as the most basic and widespread form
of mentalizing (Fonagy et al., 2002; Bateman and Fonagy, 2006;
Fonagy and Luyten, 2009). Implicit mentalization is typically
manifested in human interaction via bodily actions, such as facial
expressions, eye contact, head nods, gesture, and in-breaths.
These bodily cues are crucial in supporting alignment and a
shared understanding between interlocutors, even though they
often occur without much conscious effort or awareness (Shai
and Belsky, 2011a; Liljenfors and Lundhl, 2014; Davidsen and
Fosgerau, 2015; Fosgerau et al., 2017). Explicit mentalization,
on the other hand, is described as distinctively different from
these non-verbal behaviors since it is manifested via actions
that are “interpreted, conscious, verbal, and reflective; it is a
slow process that necessitates awareness and effort” (Shai and
Belsky, 2011b, p. 188). In short, it is assumed that since implicit
mentalizing behavior is non-verbal, explicit mentalizing, by
definition, relies on verbal actions allowing for more deliberate
and conscious reflection.
In this article, we challenge this basic assumption in
mentalization theory by investigating examples of mentalizing
actions from psychotherapy that, to varying degrees, require
attention, awareness, effort, and conscious actions without
involving verbal language. In doing so, we undertake an
embodied perspective on mentalization informed by a vantage
point in phenomenology and embodied cognition (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962; Thompson, 2007; Colombetti, 2014; Gallagher,
2017). This perspective emphasizes both the essential role of
the body and the crucial role of the environment in the
cognitive abilities. These theoretical frameworks are important
for this study since they support the idea of conscious reflective
mentalizing as unfolding within embodied actions rather than
relying on language. The contemporary view on embodied
cognition stresses the vital role of embodied actions in the ways
in which we think, feel, and reason both about ourselves and
in relation to other people. Thus, another central objective of
the article is to offer an alternative way of thinking about the
role of the bodies in conveying more complex understandings of
other people.
In sum, in this qualitative study, the authors explore the poles
of implicit and explicit mentalization, and the space between the
poles, by analyzing four different examples from psychotherapy
that (1) exemplify both the range and interrelated nature of
the elements involved in implicit and explicit mentalization and
(2) challenge the standard assumption of explicit mentalization
as primarily based on verbal language. The overall argument
is that explicit mentalization can also be part of a non-verbal
embodied behavior.
Following from this, we ask the questions:
• How does the line between implicit and explicit mentalizing
unfold in practice in real-life psychotherapy data from the
perspective of embodied interaction?
• How do implicit and explicit mentalizing interact in the
ongoing flow of interaction, and how can explicit mentalizing
take place on an embodied level without the use of
verbal language?
The examples are based on video recordings of therapy sessions
making it possible to examine mentalizing behavior embedded
in the structures of social interaction. The selection of examples
illustrates the gradual development from predominantly implicit
mentalizing to predominantly explicit mentalizing. In the latter
part of the examples, the mentalizing activity is initiated by the
therapists on an embodied, non-verbal level, but in a marked,
enlarged, and complex manner that suggests the involvement of
a conscious reflective level.
The empirical ambition of the study is to provide qualitative
in-depth analyses based on authentic data in relation to
mentalization, specifically in relation to the gradual transition
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between implicit and explicit mentalization. In this regard,
this study can be seen in conjunction with a recent trend
in mentalization studies to work with real-life data from the
perspective of different types of interaction analysis (Davidsen
and Fosgerau, 2015; Fosgerau et al., 2017; Keselman et al., 2018;
Samuelsson and Rosberg, 2018; Shaw et al., 2019).
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Mentalization
Mentalization refers to the human capacity to “hold mind in
mind” (Allen, 2006, p. 3), that is, to be able to pay attention to
and interpret the intentions that drive our actions and behaviors.
It addresses the capacity to be aware of the thoughts and the
feelings of other people, as well as those of our own, and the ways
in which we, implicitly and explicitly, display or communicate
this awareness. Thus, the locus of mentalization is the unique
human capacity for developing an awareness of the actions of
ourselves and others on a meta-level in the sense of being able
to imagine and interpret what lies behind the mere physical
manifestations of human actions (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009;
Liljenfors and Lundhl, 2014; Fonagy and Bateman, 2019). In
this regard, the concept of mentalization interfaces with other
concepts such as metacognition, social cognition, and empathy
(Choi-Kain and Gunderson, 2008; Davidsen and Fosgerau, 2015;
Fosgerau et al., 2017). According to mentalization theory, the
ability to mentalize is developed and rooted in early childhood
experiences. Research shows that the capacity of the parent to
consider and treat the child as a psychological agent motivated
by mental states is associated with infant attachment security,
so that the quality of the relationship between the child and its
caretakers impact profoundly the rate of development and the
future competence of the child in mentalizing in general (Fonagy
et al., 2002; Shai and Belsky, 2011a).
In a clinical context, the concept of mentalization was used
by Fonagy and Bateman (Fonagy, 1991; Fonagy and Target, 1996;
Bateman and Fonagy, 2006) in relation to treating patients with
borderline personality disorders (BPD). Following from this, the
notion of mentalization has led to the psychodynamic treatment
program Mentalization-Based Treatment (MBT). MBT was
designed for people with BPD who suffered from disorganized
attachment, thereby failing to develop a sustainable capacity
for mentalization. Therefore, the aim of MBT treatment is
related to increasing and consolidating the ability to mentalize,
so that patients can improve their affect regulation and hence
strengthen their interpersonal relationships. More recently, the
notion of epistemic trust (Fonagy and Allison, 2014) has been
introduced to underline the importance of the “mentalizing
therapist” as a common factor in psychotherapy. Epistemic
trust refers to the level of trust an individual dares to offer
in relation to social learning in an attachment context. In the
case of relational childhood trauma, traumatized individuals may
protect themselves by the defensive exclusion of information
in social situations and, hereby, developing epistemic mistrust
(Knox, 2016). In this sense, the primary focus for the therapist
is to (re)establish a trustful relationship together with the patient
to the social world as a learning environment.
Dimensions of Mentalization
As stated in the introduction, mentalization is a multifaceted
phenomenon building on four different dimensions, each related
to two different poles that are supposed to rely on distinct neural
systems (Sapute and Lieberman, 2006). Several neuroscientific
studies have examined the neural grounding for different types
of pathological behaviors such as autism in relation to the poles
inherent in the different dimensions ofmentalization (Jung, 2014;
Crespi et al., 2016; Carver et al., 2017).
One dimension is self-other, which refers to the fact
that mentalizing is considered both an interpersonal and an
intrapersonal phenomenon, in the sense that the mentalizing
process can be directed at one’s own thoughts and feelings
as well as at the underlying thoughts and feelings of others.
Another related dimension is internal-external, which designates
the distinction between having a focus on internal thoughts
and feelings as opposed to having a focus on external
behavior or features that point back to underlying thoughts
and feelings. Next, there is the dimension of cognitive-
affective, which concerns the fundamental distinction between
reflective reasoning and thinking and a more basic emotional
understanding and attunement. It is important to stress that the
mentalizing process is not a fixed property, as it can vary both
in relation to the context and the interpersonal relation as well
as in relation to the different dimensions (Fonagy and Luyten,
2009; Fonagy and Bateman, 2019). As such, one person can have
average or good mentalizing abilities in one area and limitations
or impairments in another area (Fonagy and Luyten, 2009).
Marked Mirroring in the Intersection
Between Implicit and Explicit Mentalization
The dimension of implicit and explicit mentalizing is typically
understood via an additional set of distinctions, such as non-
verbal (embodied) vs. verbal, non-conscious vs. conscious,
reflective vs. unreflective (automatic), and slow vs. fast. There
is general agreement that implicit mentalizing is fast, automatic,
and non-verbal while explicit mentalization relies on words and
reflective conscious awareness (Fonagy and Bateman, 2019).
However, in descriptions of so-calledmarkedmirroring and affect
regulation between the parents and the infants, the distinctions
between implicit and explicit mentalizing are more blurred
(Fonagy et al., 2002). Marked mirroring concerns the ways in
which parents mirror the actions and facial expressions of infants
in a way that is both congruent and attuned while also being
marked in a way that indicates an affect belonging to the infant,
not the parents’ own affect. This specific aspect of mentalization
concerns the imaginative quality of mentalization, that is, the way
mentalizing “is positioned within the interpersonal ‘workhorse’
of the social imagination” (Fonagy and Bateman, 2019, p. 4).
These imaginative behaviors are typical and vital for both
playful and comforting episodes between the parent and the
child. According to Fonagy et al. (2002), this marking can
only be accomplished “by producing an exaggerated version of
the realistic emotion expression of the parent, similarly to the
marked ‘as-if’ manner of emotion display that is characteristically
produced in pretend play” (pp. 177–178). As noted by Liljenfors
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and Lundhl (2014, p. 43), it is important to “mark” the facial
expressions for the child to be able to “distinguish the mirrored
expression from the parent’s own emotional expression—or, in
other words, without the ‘marking,’ the affects that are expressed
would not be perceived by the child as representing the child’s
own affects.” This suggests a rather complex type of mentalizing
activity in which the parent must be able to display affect and
emotions belonging to both themselves and the child, requiring
some level of conscious reflection and affective imagination. Still,
this is an embodied process emerging from the ongoing bodily
dynamics and displayed without the use of words, which suggests
that the distinction between implicit and explicit mentalizing is
less clear-cut than it is often portrayed in the literature.
It is this specific quality of mentalization that is explored in
the latter part of the analyses from the perspective of embodied
cognition and studies of re-enactment.
Embodied Cognition and the Phenomenal
Body
The core tenet in the notion of embodied cognition is the
assumption that the cognitive capacities are fundamentally
shaped by the bodily functions. That is, the properties of the
human body constrain the concepts that human beings acquire
and entertain (Shapiro, 2011). Thus, the workings of themind are
part of the workings of the body from the very start. In this way,
such psychological concepts as memory, perception, calculation,
and language comprehension are never to be understood as
purely mental and abstract categories separated from the bodies.
Instead, they are all rooted in bodily experiences and various
sensorimotor capacities. In contemporary terminology, this view
of the body is often termed as embodiment (Gibbs, 2005; Johnson,
2007; Shapiro, 2011). In a historical perspective, this view of
the meaning and importance of bodily experiences owes a great
deal to the phenomenological tradition, in particular the work of
Merleau-Ponty. According to Merleau-Ponty (1962); the human
body needs to be conceptualized in terms of both the objective
biological body (körper) as a physiological entity on the one hand
and the body as an experiential quality (leib) on the other. The
latter denotes the phenomenal body referring to one’s body as it is
experienced by the same person. It is this dimension of the bodies
that is at the heart of embodiment in the sense that we first and
foremost experience our bodies not as a physiological objective
reality but rather as a potential for action via movement and
phenomenal sensitivity. Furthermore, a recent tendency in the
field of embodied cognition is inspired by distributed, enactivist,
and ecological developments in the field of cognitive science
(Thompson, 2007; Hutchins, 2014; Gallagher, 2017), making it
possible to claim that the phenomenon we call cognition emerges
from processes that are distributed across the brain, the body,
and the environment. This development in cognitive science
has been described with different terms, such as distributed
or embodied, enacted, embedded, and extended (in short 4E
cognition) (Menary, 2010). As such, the way the authors use
“embodied” in this article is meant to be an umbrella term
to some extent encompassing all the different E’s. This also
implies that the authors, for reasons of space, do not go into
discussions on the subtle internal differences between these new
approaches while instead focusing on the commonalities that,
seen together, set them apart from a more standard in-the-head
view on cognition1. A shared assumption across the different new
approaches is that cognition cannot solely be understood in terms
of processes taking place in the head (or in the brain). Thus,
even though cognition is clearly dependent on neural activation
in the brain, it cannot adequately be understood as an internal
process. The key to this new understanding of the notion of “the
mind” is to avoid treating percepts, concepts, propositions, and
thoughts as quasi-objects (mental entities or abstract structures)
while instead seeing them “as patterns of experiential interaction.
They are aspects or dimensions or structures of the patterns of
organism-environment coupling (or integrated interaction) that
constitute experience” (Johnson, 2007 p. 117).
Thus, embodied cognition is bound to action, in the sense
that cognition is more than an internal precondition for action.
It is not only to be seen as an inner mental architecture that
underlines the way we are able to navigate in the world but rather,
cognition is that navigation itself. In other words, cognition
is understood as the active sensemaking of a living agent that
navigates and explores its world in movement, perception, and
action. In this way, cognition is no longer understood in terms
of an internal, and universally structured, schema but rather
as a coupling between the bodies and their environment. This
dimension of embodied cognition is of particular interest for
the exploration of embodied mentalizing on both an implicit
and explicit level that, by definition, involves an embodied
intersubjective engagement with the affordances, physical as well
as social, of the environment. Imagining what lies behind the
actions of the interlocutors, and conveying this understanding,
is not a pure “mental act” but rather an aspect of the “patterns of
experiential interaction” (Johnson, 2007) in which we think and
feel by engaging with the interpersonal environment.
In relation to social interaction, a concrete manifestation
of this way of thinking about this embodied interpersonal
engagement can be found in the notion of re-enactment, which
we will briefly introduce in the next section.
Re-Enactment
The term re-enactment addresses the ways in which people
engage in social interaction that convey or perform the previous
situations during the ongoing flow of conversation. The notion
of re-enactment is closely related to, and builds on, reported
speech, which has been investigated within both literary studies
and linguistics (Bakhtin, 1981; Semino and Short, 2004; Prior
et al., 2006), as well as footing studied within micro-sociology
(Goffman, 1979). In both cases, the focus is on how participants,
in reporting a previous event, shift perspective and convey that
they are “now speaking as someone else” (Goffman, 1979). This
can be carried out in a number of ways, most often involving
the use of direct speech. As implied in the term re-enactment,
“reporting” clearly involves more than just repeating the words
1For discussions on these and related issues, see Chemero (2011), chap. 2, and
Gallagher (2017), chap. 2.
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from a previous speech event; it is also a way of re-doing or re-
playing what took place and, in this way, it involves a strong
aspect of acting or performing the action, not just reporting it.
A crucial aspect of re-enactment is the way that the reported
action is embodied by participants in the here-and-now by use of
gesture, facial expressions, posture, tone of voice, etc. (Streeck,
2009; Jensen, 2014; Jensen and Pedersen, 2016; Goodwin,
2018). In the analytical section, a particular way of performing
re-enactment is presented. It is one that is performed by the
therapist but carried out without the use of words. Instead, the
re-enactments rest on a number of embodied resources such
as posture, facial expression, and breathing. Thus, it is in fact
not a case of speaking as someone else but instead of acting as
someone else.
To sum up, the framework of embodied cognition, as well as
the notion of re-enactment, involves a perspective on embodied
action as much more than just a type of “automatic behavior.”
Rather, the bodies are mindful organisms, and embodied action
is how we think from the very start. This view builds on
the phenomenological tradition of the phenomenal body as
the primary source of experience for intersubjective relations.
Thinking, reflection, and affect are not disembodied and purely
abstract processes. Instead, they are processes that unfold over
time and take place in concrete situations, which involve felt
experience and a bodily sense of the environment including other
people. This perspective will be brought to play in relation to
the distinction between implicit and explicit mentalization in the
analytical section.
DATA AND METHOD
Dataset, Ethics, and Methodology
The dataset used in this article comes from a large cognitive,
ethnographic study conducted at a Danish psychiatric hospital.
The dataset consists of video recordings of authentic therapeutic
conversations between therapists and patients diagnosed with
social anxiety disorders and/or personality disorders. Altogether,
26 patients were recruited for the study and all sessions of each
patient (pending from 6 to 50 sessions per patient) were recorded.
The video recording was carried out using two stationary cameras
that were placed so as to interfere as little as possible with
the therapy. This study was reported to the Southern Danish
Regional Committee on Health Research Ethics and the Legal
office of the University, in which the project is registered. All
patients and therapists have given their written consent. This
article uses anonymized versions of the data translated from
Danish to English. Written informed consent was obtained
from the participants for publication of their cases as well as
the accompanying drawings. The drawings were made by a
professional illustrator and were completely anonymized; still,
due to their level of detail, they allow for a detailed impression
of the facial, postural, and gestural actions in situ of both the
therapist and the patient. The use of drawings has the advantage
of giving more direct access to the embodied dynamics of the
interaction compared to only a textual transcription.
The interactional method is based on multimodal interaction
analysis (MMIA) (Goodwin, 2018). This combines a basic
transcription of words; notations of basic prosodic features, such
as pitch, volume, speed, intonation, and tone of voice (e.g.,
smiling or crying voice); and drawings of the interlocutors.
MMIA is devised to investigate social interaction as a whole-
bodied activity embedded in a physical and social environment.
Central to the method is the assumption that verbal and
bodily non-verbal dimensions of language are equally important
dimensions of language use. This means that MMIA considers
the full array of situated embodied actions, including gesture,
gaze, facial expression, posture, and head movement, in
concordance with verbal utterances. Through MMIA, it is
thus possible to investigate language use as an embodied
activity connected to affect and emotion in and through
embodied actions.
Analytical Procedure and Case Selection
This paper is a qualitative study of different types of mentalizing
actions in relation to the gradual distinction between implicit
and explicit mentalization in real-life interaction. To obtain a set
of examples from the dataset, the first author collaborated with
three of the therapists connected to the project who are also co-
authors of the study. Two of them also function as therapists
in the cases presented below. All the therapists work with MBT
as their primary therapeutic method, and they all have a strong
interest in the embodied aspects of mentalization. The examples
presented in the analysis are all selected to exemplify the general
assumption in the field that the difference between implicit and
explicit mentalization exists on a continuum covering implicit,
partly implicit, partly explicit, and explicit types of mentalizing
activities. To gather relevant examples in relation to this specific
dimension of mentalization, the following criteria for selection
were defined: (1) the case should involve a situation in which a
visible or audible embodied action from the therapist directed
at the patient can be detected; (2) the embodied actions should,
in varying degrees, function as intelligible part of the interaction
independently of verbal actions; and (3) the embodied actions
should, to varying degrees, function as mentalizing activity in
the sense that they address the mental state of the patients.
Ten potential examples were gathered, and the collection was
narrowed down to four cases that represent the gradual transition
from implicit to explicit mentalization, in the sense that the
first examples primarily involve implicit mentalizing while the
latter examples are predominantly explicit. The selections, as
well as the analyses, are conducted from the perspective of
embodied cognition in relation to mentalizing activities. Further,
the defining criteria for treating the latter part of the examples
as involving explicit mentalization was based on the degree of
conscious reflection and imaginative awareness as part of the
embodied actions.
ANALYSES AND RESULTS
Therapeutic Background for the First Case
The first example involves a male patient (P) in his mid-
thirties and a female therapist (T). The patient is suffering
from generalized anxiety disorder and panic attacks, and he has
previously had problems with eating disorders and drug abuse.
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During therapy, P has revealed for the first time that as a child
he was abused by a teacher. He has never told anyone about this
before and he still becomes overwhelmed with guilt and shame
when talking about the abuse. Today, P lives in a homosexual
relationship and he has just reported to T that together with his
husband he wants to adopt a child. However, he now worries that
telling about the abuse in therapy might influence the chances of
the couple to adopt a child. Thus, in the first part of the sequence
(line 1), P conveys his concern that being open about the abuse in
his childhood will not only “ruin that chance” of adopting a child
but also possibly destroy the relationship with his husband. The
therapist then attempts to mirror and display an understanding
of this concern.
Analysis of Example 1
Danish original version
1. P: faktisk ehm og der føler jeg lidt jeg nærmest sådan har
kunne ødelægge den chance nu
2. [◦◦hvis man kan sige det sådan◦◦]
3. T: [.hhh::::::: ] o(hh)kay:: hmm::
4. P: faktisk så det var derfor jeg egentlig aldrig ville have sagt
noget herude øh fordi omvendt
5. altså ja
6. T: blev du bange for konsekvenserne for (barnet?)
7. P: jeg blev glad dengang da du sagde til at starte
8. med at fordi at je- der bragte jeg det faktisk allerede på
banen hvor du sagde at øh
9. (1:5) at du så du bare kun som noget positivt at øh altså-
10. T: at man arbejder med tingene
11. P: ja at jeg gik i behandling og fik det bedre
English translation
1. P: actually ehm and in that respect I feel a little bit that I
have almost ruined that chance by now
2. [◦◦if you can put it like that◦◦]
3. T: [.hhh::::::: ] o(hh)kay:: hmm::
4. P: actually that’s why I in fact never would have said
anything out here eh because reversely well
5. yeah
6. T: you became afraid of the consequences [for the child]
7. P: [I was happy] back then when you said to start with that
8. because I actually I already brought it up when you said
that eh (1:5) that you only saw it as
9. something positive at eh well I
10. T: that you work with things
11. P: yes that I went into treatment and got better
In line 3, after P has just revealed his concern about ruining
his chance for adoption (see Figure 1), the therapist makes a
deep in-and-outbreath with a slightly prolonged sound that
leads into the following “okay.” This clearly audible action is
accompanied by the therapist raising her upper body and leaning
slightly backward as well as opening her eyes more widely with
a concerned look on her face (see Figure 1). These combined
bodily actions are carried out in overlap with the remains of
the turn of the patient in line 2, which makes it clear that
embodied actions of T function as an immediate response to
the revelation of T in line 1. In this way, the embodied actions
of T display both a slight surprise as well an acknowledgment
of the information given in line 1 as being new to the therapist
(indicated by the widening of her eyes as well as the sigh itself).
Furthermore, the sigh is displayed in such a way that it appears as
expressing an emotional stance of sympathy and understanding
toward the situation of the patient (appearing right after the
utterance of concern of the patient). As such, these embodied
non-verbal actionsmight, on the face of it, be a possible candidate
for an embodied type of explicit mentalizing, since they form
a visible and audible action directed at the state of the patient.
However, the sigh is tightly intertwined with the verbal action.
The outbreath leads into the verbal articulation of “okay” and as
such, the sigh is not marked as an independent action. Rather,
the non-verbal actions (the “okay” is also immediately followed
by a “hmm”) are functional parts of the overall verbal action of
mirroring and expressing sympathy for the patient, but not as
independent actions.
The unmarked and immediate nature of these embodied
actions seems to be more in line with the fast, intuitive, and
non-conscious character of implicit mentalizing. The in-and-out
breath is audible but it does not stand alone, since the last part
of it is intertwined with the articulation of the verbal action.
Still, it is interesting to notice that this initial implicit act of
mentalizing is afterward followed by a verbal and explicit form
of mentalizing. A few seconds later, in line 6, the therapist takes
the turn and verbalizes how the patient might feel right now:
“you became afraid of the consequences.” This explicit shift in
perspective seems to have a positive effect on the patient since
the patient afterward presents an alternative view focusing on
the positive side of going to therapy leading to how he “got
better.” To sum up, the outline in the first example seems to fit
the description in the literature of implicit mentalizing as non-
verbal and largely automatic vs. explicit mentalizing based on
verbal actions and reflections.
In the next example, however, the embodied actions seem to
have a more independent character.
Therapeutic Background for the Second
Case
The second example involves a 40-year-old female patient and
the same female therapist in example 1. The patient has been
diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and paranoid
personality traits. A recurrent theme in the therapy sessions is the
way the patient protects herself from others, either by means of
aggressive behavior or by shutting her emotions down so as not
to feel weak. The background for the discussion in the extract
is the illness of the mother of the patient. Her mother is sick
with terminal cancer and the patient is experiencing emotions
of sadness and concern, which the patient usually regards
as forbidden emotions making her vulnerable to attacks. The
patient therefore reacts by forming a self-protecting strategy of
suppressing emotions and by scolding herself in a condescending
tone. Previously, this strategy has proved helpful, because it has
enabled her to escape from vulnerability and assaults, but now,
the therapist attempts to present a new perspective of these
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FIGURE 1 | Bodily actions in relation to example 1.
FIGURE 2 | Bodily actions in relation to example 2.
emotions as normal and necessary. Right before the sequence, the
patient has stated that she is somewhat like a man: tough, strong,
and never vulnerable.
Analysis of Example 2
Danish original version
1. P: tører øjnene og så.sh sådan mander mig op ik og så [går
jeg videre]
2. T: [du bruger ordet] man ja
3. du siger mande mig op det er jo også noget der kommer
fra mand
4. P: ja
5. P: ja (0.5) jamen det er rigtig nok det gør jeg
6. T: men selv mænd bliver jo kede af det når deres mor er
ved at dø
7. P: ◦ja◦
8. T: og det er ikke sikkert hun er det men hun er i hvert fald
på en eller anden måde lidt i livsfare ik
9. P: ja
10. T: det kan jeg virkelig godt forstår du bliver ked af
11. P: ja
12. T: (2:0).hhh hhhh::
13. P: men jeg har det meget ambivalent med fordi jeg tænker
jo meget på det her i øjeblikket
14. ik med at hun risikerer jo at dø og hvad så
English translation
1. P: dry your eyes and then like man up right and then [I
move on]
2. T: [you use the] word man yes you say man up
3. and that is also something that comes from man
4. P: yes
5. P: yes (0.5) well that is true enough I do that
6. T: but even men get sad when their mother is about to die
7. P: ◦yes◦
8. T: and it is not certain that she is but she is somehow a bit
in mortal danger right
9. P: yes
10. T: this I really do understand that it makes you sad
11. P: yes
12. T: (2:0).hhh hhhh::
13. P: but I feel very ambivalent in relation to this because I
think a lot about this at the moment right
14. her risking to die and then what
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FIGURE 3 | Bodily actions in relation to example 3.
FIGURE 4 | Bodily actions in relation to example 4.
In line 1, the patient uses the conventional expressions “dry
your eyes” and “man up” in relation to managing her emotional
state regarding the severe illness of her mother. The therapist
immediately picks up on the use of the expression “man up.”
In lines 2–3, the therapist draws attention to the wordings by
remarking on the gender connotations in these expressions in a
lighter tone of voice while smiling, indicating a playful dimension
in the talk despite the severity of the topic. The patient seems
to accept this perspective for a brief while, and subsequently, in
line 10, the therapist verbalizes explicitly that she understands the
feelings of sadness of the patient (even though the patient has not
explicitly admitted to these feelings). The “yes” of the patient in
line 11 (see Figure 2) indicates the acceptance of this emotional
empathic perspective on herself, which is unusual since she often
rejects this emotional side of herself. Thus, the pause in line 12
occurs at a sensitive moment in the interaction allowing both
the patient and the therapist to “rest” in this emotion for a brief
while. The pause is then followed by a marked in-and-out breath
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 June 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 577702
Jensen et al. Mentalizing Bodies
by the therapist that underlines this emotional state even further.
The sigh is distinctively expressive as it displays sympathy and
understanding of the situation of the patient (see Figure 2).
Unlike the previous examples, the embodied action, in this case,
is not closely intertwined with verbal actions. It was preceded by
a relatively long pause and it is not followed by further verbal
actions from the therapist.
As such, the sigh qualifies as an action in its own right to
a larger degree than in example 1. The sigh functions as an
intelligible part of the interaction, as if it were an utterance
without being intertwined with verbal actions. However, the sigh
is short lived, lasting only a second, and it is primarily emotional
in nature. It carries emotional warmth and expresses an emotion
of sympathy, but it is not clear to what degree it requires
conscious reflection. It, first and foremost, seems to add extra
emotional value to the pause that precedes it, therefore allowing
for both the patient and the therapist to feel this emotion a bit
deeper. However, the patient does not directly respond to the sigh
as one often does to a verbal action, and, as such, the embodied
mentalizing action of the therapist is not treated as explicit by the
patient. This does not mean that it is a straightforward example
of an implicit type ofmentalizing. Clearly, it shares characteristics
with an explicit way of mentalizing since it stands on its own and
is evidently directed at the state of mind of the patient. However,
since it is primarily emotional in character and seems to require
less conscious reflection, it appears as largely implicit although
with certain traits of an explicit dimension.
Therapeutic Background for the Third Case
The third example involves a woman in her mid-twenties and
a female therapist in her mid-thirties (the therapist is not the
same as the one in the previous two examples). The patient is
suffering from social anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder.
The patient has previously been in treatment for her anxiety
disorders without significant results. A recurrent theme in the
therapy sessions work has been her interpersonal relationships
and, in particular, her difficulties in expressing her own needs
and desires, setting proper boundaries, and breaking a pattern of
avoidant behavior.
In this excerpt, the patient is trying to convey to the therapist
how she is dealing with her difficulties in expressing what she
wants. As part of a new positive development, she has now
become more aware of her own needs and begun a process of
being more explicit about them in conversation with others,
although it is still experienced as being difficult. In the extract
below, the patient gives an example of this process.
Analysis of Example 3
Danish original version
1. P: jeg har brug for det det ehr [ja:ahr] det det er jo heller
ikke nødvendigt at jeg har brug
2. T: [◦◦mh◦◦]
3. for det (.) >det er det< øh [åh] jeg synes det er svært
stadigvæk den der∗jeg har brug for∗
4. T: [◦◦mh◦◦]
5. ∗jeg har brug for∗ ja.hh phh: ja
6. P: ja he he he
7. T: bare det at sige det højt herinde [det] jeg kan næsten
[mærke det]
8. P: [JA] [det er] ubehageligt]
9. T: ja
10. P: hvor det sådan uhm men men
English translation
1. P: I need this that’s [yea:hr] it it is not really necessary that
I need it (.) >it is< eh [oh] I still think it is
2. T: [◦◦mh◦◦]
3. hard this ∗I need∗
4. T: [◦◦mh◦◦]
5. ∗I need∗ yes.hh phh: yes
6. P: yes he he he
7. T: just saying it loud in here [it] I can almost [feel it]
8. P: [YES] [it feels] uncomfortable
9. T: yes
10. P: it’s like ehm but but
In the first half of the sequence, from lines 1 to 3, the patient is
engaged in giving an example of how hard it is for her to express
her needs in a straightforward way. The patient uses the phrase “I
need this” a few times framed as self-reported speech conveying
in a direct manner, a situation in which she has felt the need to
express her own wishes in this way. She reports both her words
“I need this” as well as her inner thoughts and doubts back and
forth about the legitimacy of making such a claim: “ahr it it is
not really necessary that I need this (.) it is.” In attending to
the description of the patient, the therapist is actively engaged
in an embodied pattern of paying attention and giving response.
Twice during the description of the patient, she moves her upper
body backward while opening her eyes more widely and giving
a minimal response in a low voice (lines 2 and 4). This is a
typical way of displaying attention and interest during the flow
of conversation and, in relation to the theme of this article, a
clear-cut type of implicit mentalizing behavior (Fosgerau et al.,
2017). However, in line 5, the therapist makes a shift in behavior.
First, she repeats the phrase in question “I need this” in an overtly
articulated manner while making a pointing gesture directed at
herself (see Figure 3) and just afterward, she makes an enlarged
in-and-out breath while making amove backward with her upper
body (see Figure 3). The marked and overtly enlarged nature of
these actions provides them with an affective emphatic quality
that suggests that they are carried out from the perspective,
not of the therapist, but of the patient. It is, in other words, a
marked mirroring displaying an imaginative act of mentalizing
as described in the theory section. That is, these embodied verbal
and non-verbal actions in combination are directed toward the
emotional state of the patient, not only by describing them
from the outside but also by attempting to relive them from
the perspective of the patient. As such, the therapist adopts an
allocentric perspective where she acts and speaks as someone else,
in this case, as the patient. As described in the theoretical section,
the phenomenon of shifting perspective in this manner by using
direct or reported speech is widespread and has been documented
in numerous studies (Goffman, 1979; Bakhtin, 1981; Semino
and Short, 2004; Prior et al., 2006). However, the phenomenon
typically refers to reporting or re-enacting the speech and/or
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behavior of someone not present in the current conversational
situation. Here, the direct speech concerns the interlocutor and
is followed by an embodied performance approaching or re-
enacting the perspective of the patient. Thus, the embodied
actions of the therapist in this part of the sequence are difficult
to capture within the standard definition of online implicit
mentalization in the literature, such as in this description:
We can respond automatically, mentalizing implicitly. For
example, we often respond to others’ emotions without thinking
about it, nodding sympathetically with a concerned look on our
face as we listen to a friend talking about her child’s frightening
accident. (Allen et al., 2003, p. 2).
In this example, the enlarged and performative character of the
actions of the therapist suggests that something more is at stake
than an automatic reaction occurring “without thinking about
it.” The embodied actions are performative in the sense that
they re-enact an emotional reaction seen from the perspective
of the patient. Such a shift away from an egocentric perspective
is hard to imagine being carried out on an entirely unconscious
automatic level.
On the other hand, the embodied actions occur within a very
limited time frame (lasting only a few seconds) between two
verbal actions at the fast speed of the ongoing conversation,
and as such, the embodied actions are closely intertwined with
the verbal actions in line 5. Both the verbal repetition just
before (“I need”) and the subsequent meta-comment just after
the embodied actions, “just saying it loud in here I can almost
feel it,” are part of the overall frame of the actions. Thus, the
embodied actions in this sequence do not qualify as actions in
their own right. That is, they are only intelligible as part of
an overall series of verbal actions performed in line 5 by the
therapist. Clearly, the embodied actions add extra performative
and expressive value to what the therapist is conveying by the use
of words. Yet, the embodied actions are primarily meaningful in
the context of the verbal actions. Thus, the embodied actions in
this sequence illustrate why the distinction between implicit and
explicit mentalization is not absolute but can only be understood
on a continuum. These actions are neither completely implicit
nor completely explicit; rather, it seems reasonable to place them
in the middle of the continuum as partly implicit/partly explicit.
In the last example, however, the level of explicit mentalizing
is significantly increased.
Therapeutic Background for the Fourth
Case
This example involves a 22-year-old female patient with two
young children and the same female therapist as in examples
1 and 3. The patient is diagnosed with borderline personality
disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, as well as sub-
diagnostic symptoms of obsessive thoughts and panic attacks.
The overall topic of this sequence concerns the conflicting
emotions of the patient in relation to the hard work of raising two
young children. In particular, the example concerns the taboo of
admitting that it is sometimes a relief to leave them at the day care
in the morning and likewise it may feel exhausting to pick them
up in the afternoon. Overall, the patient is detached from her
emotions and therefore has difficulties in verbally reflecting on
her feelings in a psychologically adequate manner. The therapist
has tried to address the problems in a conventional verbal
manner but with no significant results. Now, a different strategy
from a therapeutic point of view is to approach these problems
in a primarily non-verbal embodied manner, rather than only
talking about them. The embodied non-verbal approach can
be a way to gain access to the detached emotional level of
the patient.
Analysis of Example 4
Danish original version
1. T: men hvordan har du egentlig når klokken nærmer
sig tre
2. P:.hhh [hhh så jeg]
3. T: [.hhh PHH:: hh]::: hh::.hh phh
4. P::::hh jah sådan ja(h) lige præcis sådan der
5. T: (0.5).hhh PHH:::
6. T: du får brug for virkelig at trække vej[ret dybt ikke]
7. P: [ja hh: ha det] er rigtig det er lige præcis hvordan jeg
har det
8. T: hvad griner du af
9. P: det er bare (0.5) jeg kan fortælle præcis hvordan (.) du
ved det hvordan jeg har det altså du gør
10. det lige
English translation
1. T: but how are you really when it’s close to three o’clock
2. P: so yeah.h hhh [.hhh t yes:hh]
3. T: [.hhh PHH:: hh]::: hh::.hh phh
4. P: yeah like that yes heh exactly like this
5. T: (0.5).hhh PHH:::
6. T: you really need to take a deep breath right
7. P: yes hh: he he that’s right that is exactly how I feel
9. T: what are you laughing at
10. P: it’s just (0.5) you know I can tell exactly how (.) you
know it how I feel I mean you just did it
The sequence starts with the therapist in line 1 by asking the
patient how she really feels at 3 o’clock in the afternoon, which
is the time when she usually goes to pick up her children at the
day care. Normally, a direct verbal question, like the one posed
by the therapist, requires a verbal answer for a conversation to
proceed in an orderly fashion. In this instance, however, the
patient does not produce a fully developed verbal answer. She
does initiate the beginning of what looks like the beginning of
an utterance “so yeah” but then stops and instead, she makes
a slightly prolonged in-and-outbreath, transcribed as “.h hhh.”
This bodily action is immediately mirrored by the therapist in
line 3 in which she, partly in overlap with the turn of the patient,
makes two prolonged and clearly marked in-and-outbreaths that
are accompanied by an intensified and heightened series of facial
expressions in which she, in an overtly exaggerated fashion,
breathes in and out (see Figure 4). These embodied actions are
clearly visible (and audible) and they are not intertwined with
any verbal actions. Rather, they are skillfully coordinated in a
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way that makes them function as standard contributions to the
conversation, but only here, it is not verbal utterances but bodily
actions that function as meaningful contributions. They function
as independent actions and are also treated as such by the patient
through a clear verbal confirmation in line 7: “yeah like that yes
heh exactly like this” (see Figure 4).
Furthermore, the actions mark a shift in perspective in a
way similar to example 3, only this time the shift away from
egocentric perceptive is even more evident. The therapist re-
enacts an experience, not from her own life or from her own
perspective but an experience originating from the life of the
patient and seen from the perspective of the patient, as imagined
by the therapist. Furthermore, it is apparent that the exaggerated
nature of these bodily actions is used here as “an inter-affective
tool” (Colombetti, 2014), that is, instead of talking to the patient
about how she feels, the therapist, in effect, shows the patient
how she feels. The therapist shows a version of the patient to
the patient through her embodied actions, which has a more
profound impact than if only verbalized. The complexity and
conflicting nature of the experience (feeling exhausted by the
prospect of having to pick up her children at the day care) is
clearly difficult for the patient to articulate in words, and, as such,
it is difficult both to gain access to it on an emotional level and
to reflect upon (and perhaps challenge) it on a more conscious
level. Thus, it is likely that this shared experience can help to lay
the ground for a slight emotional and cognitive change for the
patient. In seeing herself from the outside, the patient may be
able to see, accept, and understand her own actions better as part
of normalizing “forbidden feelings.” As we can see in the excerpt
and in Figure 4, the patient is now able to smile and laugh about
herself and her own behavior instead of feeling guilty about it.
In relation to the topic of this article, it seems evident that the
way in which the therapist manages to address a specific situation
and re-enact the anticipated embodied emotional response (from
the perspective of the patient) involves a series of complex
cognitive and emotional actions that can only be carried out on
the level of conscious reflection and affective imagination. Such
actions require the therapist to imagine how the patient must feel
in a specific situation and, even more importantly, they require
a conscious reflection on how to portray and communicate these
actions in a way that makes them both recognizable and authentic
to the patient. However, this does not necessarily imply that the
therapist is conscious of her actions while performing them. But
the behavior of the therapist may still be a part of an overall
intentional (and affective) stance toward the patient, known as a
therapeutic stance (Jørgensen, 2019). This involves a heightened
level of affective attention, even though the therapist may not
be completely conscious of the particular action. Conscious
action is not to be seen as an either-or phenomenon (either
completely conscious or not conscious at all); rather, it is a
gradual phenomenon with a number of different stages and
dimensions (Gibbs, 2005; Gallagher, 2017).
Further, it is important to note that “reflection” is not
to be understood as a dis-embodied abstract mental process.
Rather, it is a clear case of thinking and acting with and
through the body. The bodily actions of the therapist are
mindful actions, that is, the mental processes involved in this
concrete therapeutic work, namely the perception, the affective
attunement, and the performative imagination, are integrated
with the in-and-outbreaths and are, as such, inseparable from
this embodied activity. According to Merleau-Ponty, it is the
phenomenal body: it is a thinking and feeling body, a mentalizing
body, that does the in-and-outbreaths, not a body-instrument
controlled by the brain.
The therapist clearly succeeds in portraying this situation in
a convincing manner since the patient explicates in line 9 how
the therapist, in fact, managed to enact (an image of) her own
emotional experience: “you know it how I feel I mean you just
did it.” The choice of words of the patient is interesting here. The
therapist did it, that is, she acted as the patient from an imagined
first-person perspective, and that seems to have had a more
profound effect on the patient (on a second-person perspective)
than a verbal analysis or description.
Summing up, this last example involves a visible and audible
embodied action that clearly functions as an intelligible part of
the interaction independently of any verbal action. Furthermore,
it is evident that it is indeed a mentalizing action directed at
the state of the patient, and its performative and imaginative
character indicates a certain level of conscious reflection. As such,
it is a strong candidate for an instance of explicit mentalizing
behavior performed on an embodied level without the use
of words.
DISCUSSION
Clinical Implications of the Findings
Using multimodal interaction analysis, the article investigates
four different empirical examples from psychotherapy of both
implicit and explicit mentalizing from the perspective of
embodied cognition. This approach made it possible to explore
the distinction between implicit and explicit mentalizing as a
gradual phenomenon existing on a continuum while at the same
time allowing for differentiations between primarily implicit and
primarily explicit.
In relation to the clinical implications, we can conclude that
(1) when the mentalizing process is studied in detail in empirical
data, it is indeed possible to find embodied non-verbal actions
constituting explicit mentalization. Further, these investigations
add an extra dimension to the notion of “the inquisitive stance,”
in which mentalizing activities are seen as “a particular facet
of the human imagination” (Fonagy and Bateman, 2019, p.
3). Often, imagination is assumed to rely on language solely
(in particular, when being conveyed in conversation). However,
in the clinical context of psychotherapy, the analyses pointed
out that embodied non-verbal imagination in some cases is at
the heart of mentalizing. Examples 3 and 4 both illustrated
imaginative acts of re-enactment in which the therapists acted
as the patients as an alternative way of conveying understanding
and alignment.
(2) A clear clinical advantage of being more aware of
embodied non-verbal behavior in therapy is that embodied
behaviors, such as gestures, facial expressions, and in-and-
outbreaths, can be less intrusive for the patient. Embodied
non-verbal behaviors are to a much larger degree open to
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interpretation, and in that sense, less definite than articulated
utterances with a clear and well-definedmeaning. In using words,
the therapist, in some cases, may risk antagonizing or offending
the patient if the topic of conversation has a sensitive character,
since the therapist may come across as being too definite or
certain in her stance (i.e., the patient may not be ready to hear
the words since the therapist is “ahead of” the patient in her
interpretation of the situation). In this way, an explicit verbal
account or commentmay challenge the working alliance, whereas
embodied non-verbal actions are more open to interpretation
and more likely to display understanding and empathy. In this
way, embodied therapeutic actions can work as an invitation for
patients to elaborate and to stay curious about their patterns of
reactions and the mental states related to them.
(3) The results of the study contain the potential to improve
therapeutic treatment as well as further training of therapists.
When the therapist re-enacts the emotion which the patient
experiences as shameful or in other ways unacceptable, s/he
also acts as a role model for acceptance and containment. This
intervention can be used early in the treatment and can give the
patient a sense of being seen and accepted by the therapist. This
can also help to build an effective alliance between the therapist
and the patient, which is considered the most important factor of
psychotherapy (Lambert and Barley, 2002; Horvath et al., 2011).
(4) Finally, the findings in this study also have clear
implications for practices beyond talking therapies, particularly
in fields, such as body psychotherapy and dance movement
psychotherapy (Payne, 1992, 2017). Within these types of
therapy, movement is used to help increase the emotional,
cognitive, physical, and social integration of the patients. Inter-
relational physical movement is considered beneficial for both
physical and mental health and as a tool for stress reduction,
prevention of disease, and mood management. At the heart of
these forms of therapy is the interrelationship between the mover
and the observer, which, on a theoretical level, can be related
to the notion of embodied simulation and mirror neurons.
Empirical research in these fields (Gallese, 2001, 2005) has
documented that through mirror mechanisms on a neurological
level, “we can simulate in ourselves the same emotional and
somatosensory experiences that we observe in others. This
direct, interpersonal route of knowledge allows us to resonate in
synchrony with others and makes it possible to share dimensions
of experience at a non-conscious level, i.e., that of implicit inter-
corporeality” (Payne, 2017, p. 166). The detailed analyses of the
present study of marked mirroring involving explicit mentalizing
on an embodied non-verbal level can be seen as contributing to
both the abovementioned types of psychotherapy as well as to the
field of embodied simulation.
Limitations of the Study
The limitations of the study are first and foremost related to the
limited size of this qualitative study. It is based on only four
cases, which does not form a basis for more general observations
(although it can be used to formulate further hypotheses).
Furthermore, the cases were selected on the basis of general
research interests within the field of embodied cognition. This
means that the study, from the beginning, is shaped by specific
research interests, thus making it liable to critique from other
research fields with different agendas and methods. Further, as
mentioned in themethod section, it was the therapists themselves
that helped gather the cases and provided inputs for the analyses,
which may cause a biased interpretation. However, the analyses
were mainly carried out by the first author who is not a therapist
and did not have prior knowledge of the patients other than that
provided by the therapists.
On a more theoretical note, it is important to clarify that
even though the focus of the study is on the process of explicit
embodied mentalizing, this type of mentalizing is not necessarily
the end-goal. Non-verbal embodied activities can shift on the
dimensional scale, ranging from implicit to more explicit, and
the potential of these movements often lies in the process of
shifting from implicit to explicit. Explicit is not necessarily
better, but it is crucial to be able to investigate the movements
on the dimensional scale. Following from this, the empirical
demonstration of the gradual line between implicit and explicit
mentalizing may not appear as a surprising result. It is well-
documented that there is a fuzzy line between explicit (conscious)
and implicit (unconscious) attention and knowledge (Gibbs,
2005; Gallagher, 2017). Our attention and knowledge move
back and forth so to speak. What has previously been explicit
(how to ride a bike), is now implicit (know-how). Or reversely,
sometimes our habituated know-how (how to open a can)
may need to be “upscaled” to a more focused attention (if the
can is difficult to open). However, as previously mentioned, in
the case of mentalization, this question has often been linked
to, and to some degree reinforced by, the distinction between
non-verbal and verbal. As previously described, it has been
a standard assumption in the literature on mentalization that
implicit mentalizing is non-verbal while explicit mentalizing is
based on words and articulated reflections. Providing empirical
counterexamples against this assumption has been a central
contribution of this article.
Theoretical Perspectives
Lastly, we will discuss the perspectives of this study in relation
to contributing to the embodied cognition perspective on explicit
and intentional thinking and action.
This study can be seen in continuation of approaches within
the fields of intersubjectivity and social cognition in which
a more complex model of metacognition has been suggested
(Brinck and Liljenfors, 2013; Liljenfors and Lundhl, 2014).
Metacognition concerns the ability of the child or adult to
mentalize their own cognitions (and as such, it is clearly
linked to both the self-other and internal-external dimensions
in mentalization theory). Liljenfors and Lundhl (2014) suggest
a differentiation between implicit metacognition, perceptual
metacognition, and metarepresentational metacognition, where
implicit and perceptual metacognition are construed as relying
on “heuristics and environmental affordances” (p. 42). Thus,
perceptual metacognition does not rely on verbal language
or any other kind of metarepresentations (as opposed to so-
called metarepresentational metacognition that requires verbal
higher-order propositional strategies). Still, it does involve
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“consciousness and attention-based strategies” (Liljenfors and
Lundhl, 2014) along with attention, awareness, and effort, but
without being “explicit” in the sense of being verbally expressed.
This model is based on the potential metacognition of children
but it can also be applied to adults in the sense that “implicit,
perceptual, and metarepresentational metacognition coexist in
adult subjects, each type contributing in its particular way to the
general metacognitive machinery” (Brinck and Liljenfors, 2013,
p. 86). In relation to the present study, the concept of perceptual
explicit mentalizing fits the findings of the analyses perfectly.
Liljenfors and Lundhl (2014) suggest, based on theoretical
considerations, that it might be beneficial “to divide explicit
mentalization into perceptual and metarepresentational—the
former relying on attention, awareness, and effort but not on
verbal language, and the latter introducing language into the
picture?” (p. 42) Based on the analyses in the present study, we
are now capable of confirming this theoretical suggestion, even
though more research into the matter is still needed.
Finally, it is important to consider the role of the environment
in relation to the “mental processes” of imagination and reflection
as inherent in the perspective shift or the re-enactment that
characterizes example 4. One way to think about this question
in a different manner is to relate it to the notion of affordance
space as proposed by Gallagher (2017). This concept derives from
Gibson’s notion of affordances (Gibson, 1979), which stresses the
idea that the environment often invites, ormakes possible, certain
types of behavior while excluding others. In social interaction,
such as therapy, a vital affordance is the possibility for impulsive
action and thought enabled by the interactive environment in
the here-and-now of thinking and feeling together. Thus, the
argument from an embodied and ecological perspective is that
the explicit (reflective and imaginative) part of mentalizing
behavior that we saw in example 4 (and in part in example 3) is
not just relying on the inner mental properties of the mind of the
therapist but is, in equal measures, an emergent property of the
therapist–patient-environment. This environment is to a large
degree an arranged environment (both in physical and social
terms) set out to advance a close, both physical and affective
(“mental”), contact between the participants. Thus, the argument
from an embodied/ecological perspective would be that this
therapeutic environment offers particular types of actions that
would be less obvious in other situations (a job interview or
a work-related meeting, for instance). To some degree, the
opportunity for a shift in perspective is latent as an affordance in
the close interpersonal therapist–patient dyad, that is, to imagine
the perspective of the other is a way of attuning to each other and
the constraints of the environment:
We should think of imagination first as a kind of active
engagement with possibilities. One does not need to generate
ideas in one’s head about these possibilities if one can “see” them
in the process of interacting with objects and others. Playacting,
as a practice of imagination, allows for expansion of a set of
affordances—an expansion of the affordance space. (Gallagher,
2017, p. 193–194).
In this light, the explicit dimension in mentalizing behavior is
not solely an inner ability or hidden mental process in the head
of an individual, but it is more accurately to be understood
as an expansion of the local affordance space. It is a skillful
re-configuration of the therapist–patient ecology enabled by
mentalizing bodies.
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